La Vía Campesina and its Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform

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Vía Campesina’s ‘Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform’ (GCAR) has made a significant impact (inter)nationally in reshaping the terms of the land reform debates. However, its impact on other land policy dynamics has been marginal. Meanwhile, the campaign inadvertently exposed latent class-based and ideological distinctions within the transnational network. This essay explains how the GCAR emerged, and has been able to influence the broader global land reform debates, but has not been able (so far) to significantly impact other major dimensions of the land policy debates. It argues that if GCAR is to retain relevance, it must deepen and broaden its current position on land to go beyond the parameters of conventional land reform. Moreover, it must also find ways to better integrate ‘global issue framing from above’ with ‘local/national campaigns from below’ if it is to strengthen its process of ‘issue/campaign externalization/transnationalization’. Doing this may require the network to rethink some of its well-established organizational practices and ideological perspectives.

Keywords: La Vía Campesina, land reform, transnational social movement, peasant movement

ORIGINS OF VÍA CAMPESINA

Today, the ‘Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform’ (GCAR) by Vía Campesina and its allies has gained importance in the global land policy-making scene. Vía Campesina’s land agendas and demands (Vía Campesina 2000a, 2000b; Vía Campesina n.d.; Rosset 2006) constitute a serious counter-argument to the neoliberal doctrine (see, e.g. Broad 2002; Mayo 2005), a veritable alternative ‘voice’ from below (see, e.g. Appadurai 2006), representing marginalized rural

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peoples in the world. Why and how was this voice constituted, how has it evolved and what are its future prospects in the struggle against neoliberal globalization?

It is often assumed that the emergence of contemporary global justice campaigns such as the GCAR were the inevitable result of neoliberalism’s onslaught. Yet there are numerous neoliberal policies that did not spark contentious campaigns by social movements, as has been shown in the literature, suggesting that other factors were at play. In particular, we contend that the socioeconomic and political transformations brought about by neoliberal globalization and the changes in the international political opportunity structure, among other factors, played a significant role in determining the timing and framing of the launch of the GCAR. Calling this process ‘internationalization’, Tarrow (2005, 8) suggests that it is marked by three factors: (i) an increasing horizontal density of relations across states, governmental officials, and non-state actors, (ii) increasing vertical links among the subnational, national and international levels, (iii) an enhanced formal and informal structure that invites transnational activism and facilitates the formation of networks on non-state, state and international actors’. These factors were crucial in the case of Vía Campesina. But as discrete processes they each took time to evolve. Only after some time had passed did Vía Campesina take the momentous step to launch a campaign on land issues that would be marked by ‘sustained organizing efforts’, ‘durable network’ and ‘collective identity’ (see Tilly 2004, 3–4; Tarrow 2005, 6–7).

During the past two decades, nation-states in developing countries have been transformed by a triple ‘squeeze’: globalization, (partial) decentralization and the privatization of some of its functions (Fox 2001). Central states remain important, but are transformed (Keohane and Nye 2000; Scholte 2002; Sassen 2006; Gwynne and Kay 2004). The scope, pace and direction of this transformation, including its agrarian restructuring component (see Bernstein 2006; Friedmann 2004), have been contested by different actors (McMichael 2006, this collection; Patel 2006). The changing international–national–local linkages that structure the terms under which people accept or resist the corporate-controlled global politics and economy present both threats and opportunities for the world’s rural population. The co-existence of threats and opportunities has prompted many rural social movements to both localize further (in response to state decentralization) and to ‘internationalize’ (in response to globalization). The seemingly contradictory pressures (of globalization and decentralization) that are having such an impact on the nation-state are thus also transforming rural social movements. As a result, one sees the emergence of more horizontal, ‘polycentric’ rural social movements that at the same time struggle to construct coherent coordinative

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1 Tarrow (1994, 54) has defined political opportunities as ‘the consistent (but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national) signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form a social movement’. He has also identified four important political opportunities: access to power, shifting alignments, availability of influential elites and cleavages within and among elites. Refer also to his later explanation about the need to bring in the notion of ‘threats’ (Tarrow 2005, 240).
structures for greater vertical integration – the emergence of contemporary ‘trans-
national agrarian movements’ (TAMs).\(^2\)

Against this backdrop, Vía Campesina has evolved as an international move-
ment of poor peasants and small farmers from the global South and North. Ini-
tiated by Central, South and North American peasant and farmers’ move-
ments and European farmer’s groups, Vía Campesina was formally launched in
1993. Existing transnational networks of activists located in peasant movements
and non-governmental funding agencies in the North facilitated the earlier con-
tacts between key national peasant movements, most of which had emerged already
in the 1980s. Vía Campesina currently represents more than 150 (sub)national
rural social movement organizations from 56 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, North America, (Western) Europe, Asia and Africa.\(^3\) Since its birth,
Vía Campesina’s main agenda has been to defeat the forces of neoliberalism and to
develop an alternative revolving around the concept of ‘food sovereignty’ (see
Rosset 2006; IPC for Food Sovereignty 2006).\(^4\)

Vía Campesina’s positions and forms of action on key issues have differed funda-
mentally from its mainstream counterpart and rival, the International Federation
of Agricultural Producers (IFAP). Founded in 1946 by associations of small to big
farmers mainly from developed countries, IFAP became the sector organization for
agriculture that has claimed and made official representation to (inter)governmental
agencies. Neoliberal policies generally have not adversely affected many of its con-
stituents, at least not financially. While not a homogeneous network economically,
IFAP’s politics tend to be dominated by its economically and financially powerful
and politically conservative members (Desmarais 2007). Since the 1990s, IFAP has
also recruited or allowed entry of some organizations of poor peasants from devel-
oping countries, no doubt partly in reaction to the emergence of Vía Campesina.
Vía Campesina has a highly heterogeneous membership not only in class, gender
and ethnic terms; the ideological persuasions of its members vary as well. But in
spite of apparent differences in terms of worldviews, political agendas and methods
of work, there are important unifying commonalities too. Chief among these is
that most of Vía Campesina’s mass base more or less represents sectors in the
global North and South that are already economically and politically marginalized.
It is this profile that differentiates Vía Campesina from IFAP.

As an ‘actor’ on the world stage, Vía Campesina has gained recognition as the
main voice of organized sectors of marginalized rural peoples, thus eroding IFAP’s
previous hegemony. At the same time, like any entity that seeks to aggregate,
organize and represent a plurality of identities and interests, Vía Campesina

\(^2\) In this essay, we treat Vía Campesina loosely as a ‘transnational movement’, ‘transnational net-
work’ and ‘transnational coalition’, following the useful explanation on these categories by Khagram
et al. (2002, 9). Vía Campesina exhibits the features of all these categories depending on particular
campaigns or circumstances.

\(^3\) It focuses on seven issues: (i) agrarian reform, (ii) biodiversity and genetic resources, (iii) food
sovereignty and trade, (iv) women, (v) human rights, (vi) migrations and rural workers and (vii)
sustainable peasant’s agriculture.

\(^4\) This notion of food sovereignty also resonates with Bello’s concept of ‘deglobalization’ (Bello 2002).
constitutes an evolving ‘arena of action’, one where a movement’s basic identity and strategy may be contested and (re)negotiated over time. This dual character helps to make Vía Campesina an important institution of and for national-local peasant movements, but a complex entity for external observers and actors to comprehend and deal with (Borras 2004). This discussion on the dual character of transnational movement is similar to the notions of ‘network-as-actor’ and ‘network-as-structure’ by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 7; see related discussions in Guidry et al. 2000, 3; Batliwala and Brown 2006). The GCAR is best seen from this perspective of the movement’s dual character.

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: the next section examines GCAR, focusing on why and how it has emerged to become an important campaign. GCAR’s impact is then analyzed. The fourth section examines pending contentious issues within Vía Campesina and possible future trajectories of GCAR, followed by concluding remarks.

GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR AGRARIAN REFORM (GCAR)

Six years after its founding, Vía Campesina launched GCAR in 1999–2000, at a time when land reform was coming under attack by neo-liberals. Land policy was being resurrected on official agendas of international institutions and many nation-states for a variety of often conflicting reasons (see, e.g. Akram Lodhi et al. 2007; Rosset et al. 2006; Bernstein 2002; Byres 2004a, 2004b; Griffin et al. 2002; Ghimire 2001; Borras et al. 2007a). Departing from the classic land reform debate, the renewed interest in land policy has been dominated by a pro-market orientation. The Vía Campesina campaign is a direct reaction to the neoliberal model, the ‘market-led agrarian reform’ (MLAR).

For mainstream economists, the problem with past land policies was the central role of the state in (re)allocating land resources, leading (in their view) to distortions of the land market, resulting in ‘insecure’ property rights and investments in the rural economy. They often point to problems in public/state lands (e.g. lacking clear private property rights) as ‘proof’ of the undesirable effects of state intervention in the land market. In their view, what is needed instead are clear, formal private property rights in the remaining public lands in most developing countries and transition economies (see De Soto 2000; see also World Bank 2003; but see Nyamu-Musembi 2007 and Cousins 2007 for critical insights in the African context). Similarly, from the neoliberal perspective, the ‘failure’ of state-led land reforms in private lands is attributable to the methods of land acquisition (e.g. expropriation and coercion) that were resisted by landlords.

Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist, has argued that the potential capital of the poor is land, but that most of this is ‘dead capital’, having no individual private land titles that can be used as collateral in financial transactions. And so, investors and banks feel insecure to transact with the poor. The solution is to generate private individual land titles for the remaining public lands in developing countries. He has inspired many economists worldwide, is currently chairing the ‘Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor’ (CLEP) with secretariat support from the UNDP, which advocates the implementation of de Soto’s idea.
Clearly, landlords have subverted the policy, evading coverage by subdividing their farms or retaining the best parts of the land. They have also launched blistering legal offensives that have slowed, if not prevented, much land reform implementation. Here, there can be no room for disagreement; the historical record prevents that. The point of departure is landlord resistance to land reform – should it be evaded or confronted? (See related arguments about the nature of expropriation offered by Chonchol (1970).) Neoliberal economists see landlord resistance as something to be avoided at all costs and, arguably, it is from this core belief that the neoliberal land reform model for private lands has been constructed. This model thus posits ‘free market forces’ as the most desirable mechanism for (re)allocating land resources, envisioning a process that is necessarily privatized and decentralized. Frequently referred to as MLAR, the model inverts what it claims to be key features of the conventional ‘state-led’ model: from expropriationary to voluntary; from statist-centralized to privatized-decentralized implementation and so on (Borras 2003; Borras et al. 2007a).

The rise of this neoliberal land policy model juggernaut in the 1990s certainly did not go unnoticed, in spite of vain efforts by proponents to camouflage it as ‘anti-poverty community-based’ or ‘negotiated’ land reform, or to repackage it as ‘legal empowerment of the poor’. Yet it is important to note that the response to this policy among key state and societal actors in the land reform issue arena has been decidedly mixed, and less oppositional than one might have expected. Among those who do oppose the model, however, Vía Campesina is the undisputed leader and the GCAR was devised largely as the main vehicle for this opposition globally.

In undertaking this campaign, Vía Campesina has had to refine its initial take on the land issue, while developing and consolidating a ‘human rights-based approach’ to land. Indeed, the global framework of Vía Campesina’s position on land has been evolving over the years, with the 2006 joint declaration with the IPC for Food Sovereignty being the most comprehensive and systematic version. During the first few years of GCAR, the main call was a demand to drop MLAR. Eventually, the network’s position evolved to include a demand for the adoption of their ‘human rights’ framework and alternative vision. This suggests that the campaign has aspired to define and articulate its own interpretation of the meaning and purpose of land and land reform, as a step toward constructing an alternative vision.

Vía Campesina aspires to neither ‘sink’ (i.e. too localized) nor ‘float’ (i.e. too globalized) in this effort, but rather to ‘verticalize’ collective action (in the manner described by Fox 2001; Edwards and Gaventa 2001) by connecting local, national and international groups. Looking more closely, the emergence of GCAR involved five interlinked processes: (i) a swift externalization of national-local issues; (ii) the forging of transnational allies; (iii) the forging of a common frame and target, (iv) the opening up of faster, cheaper cross-border communication and transportation and (v) increasing autonomy and capacity to combine forms of collective action.

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6 International Planning Committee. It originated from the civil society group formed for the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome.
Swift Externalization of National–Local Issues

MLAR was carried out in countries that are important to Vía Campesina, directly affecting organizations that are influential within the network. It is largely for this reason that the ‘externalization’ (i.e. ‘the vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors’ – Tarrow 2005, 32) of national–local land issues has been so swift within Vía Campesina. In varying degrees, MLAR has been carried out in Brazil, Colombia, in Central American countries, the Philippines, South Africa and Namibia. Negotiations were attempted in other countries such as Nepal. In all these countries, only Namibia does not figure in the radar of Vía Campesina, at least not yet. Central and South America, especially Brazil, are bastions of influence of Vía Campesina, with Brazil’s MST as one of the most influential groups within the global movement. When MLAR was introduced in Brazil in 1997 through the Projeto Cedula da Terra (PCT), it quickly ran into MST base areas on the ground. At the national level, PCT gained prominence, partly because of the favourable endorsement by landlords (Navarro 1998; Borras 2003). At this point MLAR promoters were in a triumphant mood, claiming successes in different countries. But rural social movements and their allies in Brazil were convinced that PCT would not deliver gains for redistributive reform, and would only undermine the existing efforts by the state and by the landless movement (Sauer 2003). Their opposition was cemented in the National Forum for Agrarian Reform, a national forum of all the major (competing) agrarian movements in Brazil, including MST, CONTAG and FETRAF. The National Forum demanded an investigation of the PCT through the World Bank Inspection Panel, but the request was denied, twice, on technical grounds (see Vianna 2003). And despite problematic outcomes, MLAR continued and was even expanded (Pereira 2007; Medeiros 2007), making the threat more real in the eyes of MST and other Vía Campesina members in Brazil, and helping to push a rapid externalization of the Brazilian issue onto the international scene.

Meanwhile, MLAR was incorporated into peace accords in several countries in Central America in the mid-1990s. Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, for instance, witnessed the introduction of versions of MLAR, including one close to the textbook model (Guatemala; Gauster and Isakson 2007) and also a state–market hybrid (El Salvador; De Bremond 2007). Central America, however, was the birthplace of Vía Campesina, at least informally. It was where, at a conference in Managua in 1992, the first concrete idea of establishing the global movement was discussed by not only Central American peasant leaders, but also others from outside the region. The Central American peasant coalition, ASOCODE, was already virtually defunct by the time MLAR began gaining

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7 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (Movement of the Landless) – see Wright and Wolford (2003).
8 Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura.
9 Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar.
10 The official birthplace is Mons, Belgium.
11 Association of Central American Peasant Organizations for Cooperation and Development.
ground in these countries (Edelman 1998, 2003; also in this collection), but the region still remained host to some of the relatively active, relatively organized and articulate land-oriented groups in Vía Campesina. It is no coincidence that, from 1996 to 2004, the global secretariat of Vía Campesina was hosted by the Honduran organization, COCOCH, and led by COCOCH’s director Rafael Alegria. Alegria served as Vía Campesina’s general coordinator during this period. In addition, the GCAR’s international secretariat was run by seasoned cadres from the Nicaraguan organization, ATC. As a result, land issues in Central America were rapidly externalized onto the global stage and picked up seriously by allies.

Meanwhile, the Philippines was the ‘gateway’ for Vía Campesina into Asia in 1993, when outsiders’ contacts in the region were limited to KMP in the Philippines and KRRS in India. The Philippine movement facilitated further contacts in most parts of the region, and KMP was an influential member (at least until around 2004). And so when MLAR was first introduced in the Philippines in 1996, and then during the 1999 negotiation for a pilot project, the Philippine MLAR got into the radar of Vía Campesina and the GCAR, although the anti-MLAR activities were spearheaded by non-members of Vía Campesina (Franco 1999). Meanwhile, MLAR became the defining framework for the post-apartheid compromise agrarian reform in South Africa, although it is another kind of a state–market hybrid (Lahiff 2007; Ntsebeza and Hall 2006; Walker 2003). In the absence of a national peasant movement (at least until 2000), work around land reform in South Africa would be taken up by pockets of activists and NGOs, the most prominent of which was the now defunct National Land Committee or NLC (Mngxitama 2005). When the Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) was born in 2000 with the help of NLC, it quickly became a Vía Campesina member (Greenberg 2004) at the same time that the South African land issue was quickly taken up by the GCAR.

To some extent, externalization occurred out of necessity: where significant resistance to the model was mounted by Vía Campesina members, initial efforts at influencing national governments did not yield the movements’ desired outcomes, forcing peasant movements to externalize their campaigns, which enabled them to then come back to their national governments with greater power. This pattern validates the ‘boomerang effect’ advanced by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 12–13). Meanwhile, many national contestations around MLAR that were externalized onto the Vía Campesina agenda and campaign have a common feature: most

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12 For an earlier (optimistic) background on ASOCODE, see Biekart and Jelsma (1994).
13 Honduran Coordinating Council of Peasant Organizations.
14 Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo.
15 Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.
16 Karnataka State Farmers’ Association.
17 ‘When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13). But Marc Edelman explains that the boomerang effect works better for some kinds of demands than others (see Edelman in this collection).
of them involved important Vía Campesina members. Where Vía Campesina does not have a presence, or where Vía Campesina allies do not have a network, MLAR issues, however problematic, tend not to be picked up by transnational land reform activists. For example, although MLAR was carried out in Namibia (van Donge et al. 2007), or a variant of MLAR in Egypt (Bush 2007), the cases were not taken up in the GCAR because there were no Vía Campesina members in these countries.

Availability of Transnational Allies

Alliances with groups with relevant political and logistical resources are necessary. For peasant movements in the South, well-connected NGOs, funding agencies and sympathetic academics, under certain terms and conditions, hold the greatest potential as allies. But such alliances do not spring up automatically with the appearance of an issue on the horizon, no matter how urgent it may be for the movements concerned. Instead, pre-existing (in)formal networks between individuals and groups usually play a critical role in laying the groundwork for more expansive cross-national and inter-sectoral/inter-network coalition-building. And once achieved, it does not remain static.

In the case of Vía Campesina, two alliances around GCAR are important. The first involves FIAN (FoodFirst Information and Action Network), a human rights activist network composed of individuals and groups located in both the global North and South. Founded in the 1980s, FIAN focuses on putting flesh to the international UN convention on economic, social and cultural rights and particularly the ‘right to food’. For FIAN, the ‘right to land’ is a necessary prerequisite to the right to food. Before forging an alliance with Vía Campesina in 1999–2000, FIAN was able to launch its own intermittent campaigns. But while these earlier initiatives were certainly important to the participating national groups and to FIAN’s global advocacy, they were far less than what was needed to put FIAN’s message in the corridors of global power. FIAN needed the organized force and global spread of Vía Campesina. For its part, Vía Campesina members confronted on the ground by MLAR lacked a ‘master frame’ that could link their campaign into the ‘rights talk’ that was fast gaining ground worldwide during this period (De Feyter 2005) and was the most logical counter-argument against MLAR. But not all human rights advocates have an understanding of agrarian issues; not all agrarian reform advocates have an understanding of human rights law and methodology. Each network was thus recognized as complementary to the other’s work and a global alliance was forged. The alliance has managed to remain mutually beneficial and reinforcing since then, despite occasional tensions. As the campaign gained momentum, its activists quickly realized that a simple ‘expose and oppose’ and ‘agit-prop’ (agitation-propaganda) approach would be insufficient to defeat the MLAR threat. Success would require solid arguments backed up by evidence and more solid propositions regarding an alternative. This latter concern prompted a process of campaign reframing that would eventually result in the ‘agrarian reform-based food sovereignty’ call of
today. In this framing, Vía Campesina found another strategic ally in LRAN (Land Research and Action Network), a global network of individuals and research think tanks working on the issues of land, food politics, agroecology and trade, originally hosted by non-governmental research organization Food First in California, although it later became autonomous. This broadening of the campaign framework made GCAR more accessible and attractive to other (trans)national activist networks working around broader issues of food and the environment. Finally, it is worth noting that by the late 1990s, most non-governmental funding agencies had opened up new ‘global programmes’, alongside their more established country programmes, in response to the burgeoning field of transnational activism, and were seeking new partners to fund. The new global programmes became a key resource for TAMs like Vía Campesina as well as for the GCAR.

Common Meaning, Common Target

The very ‘meaning’ of land has been evolving within GCAR over time, at the same time that the World Bank’s aggressive promotion of MLAR in the 1990s was contributing to the construction of a common meaning of ‘land’. Vía Campesina activists agreed that ‘land is critical to peasants’ livelihoods, but that effective control of these resources is monopolized by the landed classes, and so the need to redistribute this to landless peasants; and MLAR will not be able to do this, in fact, it may even undermine such an effort’ (see, e.g. Vía Campesina 2000a). This was the earliest shared understanding within Vía Campesina. Since then, within the network and without necessarily departing from its original philosophical moorings, understanding of the meaning and purpose of land (and consequently the nature of the global campaign itself) has continued to evolve as a result of ongoing efforts to link the issue of land with the broader issues of food sovereignty, the environment and other development issues (especially after LRAN joined). At present, Vía Campesina’s involvement with the much broader and looser “International Planning Committee” (IPC) for Food Sovereignty (which includes pastoralists, fisherfolk and other sectors that are not particularly strong in Vía Campesina) appears to once again be re-orienting the former’s take on land even further.18

Finally, a critically important factor that facilitated the making of common cause and made possible the initial emergence of the GCAR amidst such diversity was the existence of a clear, common target (or culprit). Certainly the World Bank, as MLAR’s inventor-promoter-funder, provided a concrete, high-profile

18 Vía Campesina involvement in the much broader (in terms of representation and ideological persuasions) IPC for Food Sovereignty seems to be transforming both Vía Campesina and the IPC members through not-always-so-smooth interactions with other rural sectors, types of associations (IPC includes NGOs) and political-ideological differences (IPC includes less radical groups). This is based on the author’s own observation of some of the key events participated in by the IPC, as well as based on a comprehensive semi-structured interview of Antonio Onorati, the global focal person of the IPC (June 2007, Berlin).
target whose ‘villainy’ was also relatively easy to explain to the different subjective forces and broader publics that the campaign hoped to sway.

Faster and Cheaper Cross-Border Communication and Transportation

Breaking the monopoly on information, communication and mobility by national governments and international financial institutions is a critical and favourable change in the ‘political opportunity structure’ for (TAM) activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005; Bob 2005). It likewise partly accounts for the emergence of GCAR. When Via Campesina was formed in 1993, electronic mail was just beginning to be introduced in the NGO world, and back then there were very few peasant movements that were able to use the new technology. Instead, the fax – expensive and cumbersome (especially in handling bulk electronic documents) – remained the dominant mode of communication between Via Campesina members until roughly the end of the 1990s. The advent of free web-based email and free access to documents on more and more websites opened up new opportunities for (trans)national peasant groups to communicate quickly and to find and share crucial information. In more recent years, Skype and text messaging have become yet another important, relatively affordable means by which TAM activists can easily connect and communicate with each other across an enlarged space–time continuum. And then there is cheaper air transportation, which has expanded the mobility of GCAR activists, enabling them to meet each other (and their ‘enemies’) face-to-face in global gatherings, to witness each other’s national–local conditions, and even to literally stand together in solidarity: at a picket line or mass demonstration here, or human rights fact-finding mission there. The vastly increased opportunities for direct encounters and communications at all levels has had (and will continue to have) a profound effect on movement dynamics (at all levels), and certainly deserves more focused attention than we can give here. One important effect however has been that the monopoly by governments, big NGOs and development agencies on information related to global land policy-making has been eroded. This was clearly evident in the Philippine case, when in 1999 the World Bank began negotiating with the Philippine government to introduce MLAR, highlighting supposed MLAR successes in Latin America and South Africa. Sceptical Philippine activists, using email, quickly contacted colleagues in the United States and Latin America to ask for alternative views. Within days, the activists were armed with documents that showed the exact opposite picture of what the World Bank was claiming (Franco 1999; Borras et al. 2007a). A similar process would unfold over and over again in other countries too, with activists receiving relevant data and alternative analyses from movements elsewhere or accessing information on the web, enabling them to strengthen their advocacy positions at crucial moments.

19 It can be recalled that HTML code was only beginning to achieve widespread use in the mid-1990s. Prior to that there were text-based Internet pages and no web-based email systems (I thank Marc Edelman for reminding me about this).

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Autonomy and Capacity to Combine Forms of Collective Actions

Collective actions carried out at international political spaces often bring TAMs face-to-face with international institutions, with some of which they have a previous history of interaction, while others they do not. In either case, the threat of ‘co-optation’ hounds TAM activists. It is useful here to distinguish between two concepts: ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’. Independence is often seen as a choice in absolute terms – groups either allow themselves to be co-opted by these international institutions, or they do not, and are thus insulated from any form of external interference or influence. By contrast, autonomy is ‘inherently a matter of degree’ and refers to the amount of external influence in the agrarian movements’ internal decision-making. In this view, an organization may have relationships with other entities, but what matters is the terms of those relationships (based on Fox 1993, 28).

For Vía Campesina, the struggle for autonomy is fought on two fronts: with (inter)governmental international institutions and with NGOs. As explained in a recent organizational document, ‘We do not have a choice as to whether we interact with others who are engaged in our arena – but we have a choice on how we work to effect the changes we desire’ (Vía Campesina 2000b). It elaborates: ‘Vía Campesina must have autonomy to determine the space it will occupy with the objective of securing a large enough space to effectively influence the event’ (2000b; for background discussions see also Tadem 1996; Batliwala 2002). Meanwhile, when and how to use direct action and mobilization as a form collective action, and in the service of what broader political strategy, is a question that seems to be addressed in a rather open-ended and tentative manner within Vía Campesina, and internationalizing collective actions around land issues is not easy for the network as well (Vía Campesina 2004, 48–9).

The search for the appropriate tactics and forms of actions is linked to their inevitable interaction with global (inter)governmental institutions. The choice of what types of tactics and actions to take depends in part on what types of global institutions they interact with. The nature of a particular institution does matter for the calculation of Vía Campesina. In general, they tend to favour the UN system that adheres to a ‘one country–one vote’ representation mechanism, which helps to explain its critical but collaborative relationships with some groups within the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). But consistent with their basic framework, Vía Campesina more or less automatically takes a confrontational, ‘expose and oppose’ stance against international financial institutions, e.g. World Bank, viewing these institutions as the cause of, not the solution to, the problems of peasants and farmers.

Vía Campesina has been quite skilful in combining diverse forms of actions. It has launched confrontational actions against TNCs and their domestic partners, using militant forms of actions such as land occupation, torching of GM crop field sites, and marches in major cities. At the same time it has collaborated with pockets of allies in a few agencies on selected issues, and engaged in negotiation,
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collaboration and even joint initiatives. It is from this perspective that the strategies employed in GCAR can be better understood. It has taken an ‘expose and oppose’ position against MLAR and the World Bank, using coordinated and simultaneous militant forms of local–national–international actions, including ‘agit-prop’, public shaming and local land occupations. Meanwhile, it has undertaken collaborative work with some allies within IFAD and FAO in developing common documents, conferences and projects. These two broadly different types of approaches, each with their own type of media projection as well, are seen as mutually reinforcing. Negotiations with other agencies would be weak without the real threat that Vía Campesina can actually resort to militant forms of actions against them; conversely, purely ‘expose and oppose’ actions without intermittent negotiations would project the movement as unreasonable. A careful balancing act is required in the use of these forms of actions and good media work (for related discussions, see Hertel 2006; Bob 2005), within and beyond GCAR, and this is something Vía Campesina has been able to do relatively effectively.

In short, GCAR emerged largely because five interlinked factors associated with a change in the international political opportunity structure were present: swift externalization of national issues, emergence of allies with political and logistical resources, forging of a common meaning in the campaign and the emergence of a common concrete and easy target of the campaign, the emergence of faster and cheaper cross-border communication and transportation, and the attainment of greater degree of autonomy and capacity to combine forms of collective actions. Without the presence of all of these factors it is doubtful that the GCAR could have been launched, validating Smith and Johnston (2002, 8), who argue that while ‘increased global integration generates potential sources of unity for political movements’, other complementary factors are necessary for this potential to be realized.

INITIAL IMPACT

A few years ago, Baranyi et al. cautioned land reform observers: ‘One should not underestimate the impact that the Global Campaign for Land Reform headed by Vía Campesina might eventually have on international policy debates in this regard’ (2004, 47). How do we proceed to get a reasonable view of the impact of Vía Campesina’s global campaign? What Keck and Sikkink offer is relevant: ‘Networks influence politics at different levels because the actors in these networks are simultaneously helping to define an issue area, convince policymakers and publics that the problems thus defined are soluble, prescribe solutions, and monitor their implementation’ (1998, 201). This means that ‘We can think of networks being effective in various stages: (1) by framing debates and getting issues on the agenda, (2) by encouraging discursive commitments from state and other policy actors, (3) by causing procedural change at the international and domestic level, (4) by affecting policy; and (5) by influencing behaviour changes in target actors’ (1998, 201). Looking more closely at Vía Campesina’s campaign based on these five dimensions is better done while also keeping in mind the...
precaution offered by Tarrow: ‘advocates of transnational activist networks have highlighted many successful instances of successful intervention on behalf of actors too weak to advance their own claims. In an internationalized world, we are likely to see more of such intervention, so it is important to look at it without illusions. Transnational intervention fails more often than it succeeds’ (2005, 200).

Framing Debates and Getting Issues on the Agenda
The GCAR’s impact has been significant with regard to (re)framing debates and getting issues on the agenda. The GCAR resorted to simplified framing of the campaign: unidimensional economic perspective versus multidimensional functions of land, land as commodity versus land as a common community resource, voluntary land sales versus expropriation-based land reform, claims of MLAR’s success versus counter-claims of failures, and so on. Vía Campesina raised these issues in the context of the global debates, at the same time that its network members actually mobilized on the community level, making its advocacy well-grounded, empirically informed, and thus powerful. Today, the issues raised by Vía Campesina have become key themes in the global debates on land policies. One example of this impact could be seen in the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) – its content, and its process before, during and after the March 2006 event (see http://www.icarrd.org). It was a bold move for the FAO, or a section within FAO, to mainstream discussion of land reform at a time when most international agencies did not want to even use the same phrase in their discourse; even bolder was its decision to let Vía Campesina have an important role in it. Further evidence can be seen in the Farmers’ Forum process at IFAD, where a relatively progressive ‘land reform’ framework has been mainstreamed in the official discourse.

Encouraging Discursive Commitments from State and Other Policy Actors
A low degree of impact can be seen in this area. Aside from the official commitments from some groups within FAO and IFAD, the campaign was not able to solicit favourable commitments even at the level of promises from other agencies. But this is partly explained by the fact that GCAR has not really engaged with many institutions. Vía Campesina’s campaign has not engaged, collaboratively or confrontationally, with bilateral agencies. This has important implications because bilateral agencies have more funds, and the significance of this can be seen from three interlinked dimensions. First, these agencies have their own land policies and directly carry them out in local and national settings. There is a plurality of international agencies engaged in land policies, not just the World Bank, FAO and IFAD (Palmer 2007). Second, these bilateral agencies often provide funds to multilateral agencies, and so are influential actors in the latter. Third, many of the bilateral agencies also have co-financing schemes with non-governmental funding agencies that provide money to (trans)national agrarian movements.
Having defaulted from any significant engagement with these agencies can thus, arguably, partly account for the low degree of achievement of the campaign in terms of soliciting commitments from these actors. Finally, at the local–national level, the impact is even more marginal in terms of getting official commitments from state actors, e.g. the Lula administration has even expanded MLAR in Brazil, while the South African government has stuck it out with a hybrid MLAR.

_Causing Procedural Change at the International and Domestic Level_

A low degree of impact can be detected in this area. Some change could have been achieved if the Brazilian movements’ demand for a World Bank Inspection Panel on MLAR had gone further than just the filing. Greater degrees of transparency, participation and accountability in the agencies’ policy-framing processes have also been demanded, particularly from the World Bank and the European Union (FIAN-Vía Campesina 2004), but to no avail. Nonetheless, the campaign was able to push for some procedural changes related to IFAD and FAO processes, especially in terms of expanding ‘invited’ political spaces which could be occupied by Vía Campesina members and allies. For example, IFAD’s interface mechanism with civil society used to be dominated by IFAP and NGOs through non-confictive, generally de-politicized ‘partnership’ mechanisms. With the global campaign, Vía Campesina’s entry into this space has ended the monopoly of these politically conservative groups – and politicized the process of interaction. In Brazil, we can also call it a ‘procedural change’, i.e. the latest MLAR version (only those lands that are not subject to expropriation would be qualified for MLAR). But the effect has been negative for Vía Campesina in this country: the procedural change became the reason for MLAR expansion and for CONTAG to endorse and participate in the MLAR (see, e.g. Vianna 2003), breaking from the previous unity based on MLAR opposition within the National Forum for Agrarian Reform. One effect of this was the demobilization of the forum leading to its current state of affairs, described by one observer as in a ‘momentum of rapid fragmentation’ (Sauer 2007).

_Affecting Policy_

It is in the area of policy reform where the impact of Vía Campesina’s campaign has been the most marginal so far. The campaign has not yet been able to force a policy shift among the agencies promoting MLAR and other neoliberal land policies, and it certainly has not been able to effect the adoption of their alternative propositions in substance, either at the international or national levels. The

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20 For a more general discussion on this issue, refer to Harriss (2002).
21 In this context, there are interesting dynamics between movements involving Vía Campesina, but these cannot be treated fully here. For a useful general discussion on this theme related to NGOs, see Jordan and van Tuijl (2000).
World Bank is on the defensive, but it has not (yet) dropped its MLAR. For its part, the World Bank’s hopes are pinned on producing a successful case in Brazil, and it continues to argue that current problems with MLAR in some countries are merely operational and administrative. Meanwhile, it remains a challenge for Vía Campesina to relate with FAO and IFAD because of underlying tensions within these institutions between broadly anti- and pro-redistributive reform forces, which can produce erratic, contradictory positioning over time, including on land issues. Though important, the ICARRD is just one of several global venues that matter for global land policy political dynamics, and a relatively weaker one compared to those controlled by the bigger funders/players: the World Bank, EU and bilateral agencies. But the ICARRD was a major political achievement for Vía Campesina. Whether the momentum can be sustained and translated into policy reforms remains to be seen. Unfortunately, the apparent weakening of allies within FAO post-ICARRD (due to funding cuts and internal reorganization) does not bode well. At IFAD, Vía Campesina’s allies are located mainly in the Policy Division, a relatively weak division politically, mainly because they do not control the funds and do not directly interface with country partners. For its part, the more powerful operations division of IFAD, where the main fund is directly handled, still lacks a coherent position on land reform, and has maintained broadly pro-market tendencies.  

Influencing Behaviour Changes in Target Actors

While the campaign has contributed to behaviour changes on target institutions, these have not necessarily favoured the GCAR. For example, the World Bank took the substantive and procedural issues raised by Vía Campesina relatively seriously. But in the countries where MLAR is underway, the changes have not necessarily been positive. In the Philippines, for example, the MLAR agenda was simply repackaged and resold to a new national government (see Borras et al. 2007b). In Brazil, the World Bank fine-tuned the framework and implementation guidelines, won over the Lula administration, and recruited CONTAG to its project. When issues of transparency and accountability are raised, the World Bank is a master at recruiting other friendly civil society groups to participate in the MLAR process by way of two global electronic consultations and the regional consultations which it can later point to as proof of having promoted ‘participation’ by ‘civil society’. A problematic process protested by GCAR due to its being ‘non-transparent’ and ‘manipulative’ (FIAN-Vía Campesina 2004). Predictably, the positive behaviour changes that have occurred have been limited to some sections within the FAO and IFAD.

Footnote 22: For example, Kay (2006, 491) found out that in Latin America and the Caribbean over the years IFAD has generally followed the market-oriented land policies promoted by the World Bank. Hence, while Vía Campesina is able to gain ground at the global level with its alliance with IFAD’s key policy experts, and so on, it may lose some ground at the local and national settings if the land policies that are carried out by IFAD country programmes are contradictory to the Vía Campesina vision.
Finally, there is one especially urgent area where, unfortunately, the GCAR does not seem to have been able to effect positive behaviour changes so far, and that is in the area of rural violence and human rights violations against peasant land rights claimants. Campaigns to stop rural violence have been carried out worldwide as part of GCAR, but so far have too little effect in terms of ending the violence (for background discussions see, e.g. Vía Campesina 2006; Franco 2007; De Carvalho Filho and Mendonça 2007).

CONTENTIOUS ISSUES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES

Keck and Sikkink remind us that ‘Transnational advocacy networks must also be understood as political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate – formally or informally – the social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise’. They continue, ‘Power is exercised within networks, and power often follows from resources . . . Stronger actors in the network do often drown out the weaker ones, but because of the nature of the network form of organization, many actors . . . are transformed through their participation in the network’ (1998, 3; see also Della Porta et al. 2006, 20). Such a perspective is complemented by the explanation put forth by Tarrow that ‘Transnational activists are often divided between the global framing of transnational movement campaigns and the local needs of those whose claims they want to represent’ (2005, 76). He argues that ‘Global framing can dignify and generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial. It signals to overworked and isolated activists that there are people beyond the horizon who share their grievances and support their causes.’ He cautions, however, that ‘by turning attention to distant targets, it holds the danger of detaching activism from the real-life needs of the people they want to represent’ (ibid.; see also Bob 2005, 195). Tarrow concludes that ‘transnational activism will be episodic and contradictory, and it will have its most visible impact on domestic politics’ (2005, 219).

These are reminders that global–national/local links, representation and accountability are not unproblematic, despite what some TAM activists would claim. Of course, the everyday politics of movement-building, if anything, are about finding strategic unities amidst diverse experiences. But although understandable, the tendency to emphasize ‘unity in diversity’ (while downplaying diversity) at times risks ignoring latent tensions that warrant attention.

There are three dimensions in particular that Vía Campesina activists might consider looking into further: class differences, ideological differences and the network’s growing but still limited representation of the plural interests and identities of the rural poor. To a large extent, the hemispheric South–North divide is being sufficiently addressed by Vía Campesina in its discourse about transcending potential and actual differences through cross-border solidarity (see, e.g. Bové 2001, 96; Stedile 2002, 99–100; Desmarais 2007), while even gender differences are being addressed, albeit slowly, by agrarian movements both at the national (in the case of Brazil, see Deere 2003) and international levels (for background discussions see Vía Campesina-FIAN 2003; Monsalve 2006;
Razavi 2003). Here in particular, at the international level, Vía Campesina indeed should be seen as a good example for its establishment of parity representation between men and women in its most powerful decision-making body, the International Coordinating Committee (ICC).

Class Differences

Vía Campesina is heterogeneous in terms of its base. A rough estimate of the class profile of Vía Campesina reveals the following: (i) landless peasants, tenant-farmers, sharecroppers and rural workers mainly in Latin America and Asia; (ii) small and part-time farmers located in (Western) Europe, North America, Japan and South Korea; (iii) family farms in the global South, including those in Africa as well as those created through successful partial land reforms, such as those in Brazil and Mexico; (iv) middle to rich farmers mainly, but not solely, in India; and (v) semi-proletariat located in urban and peri-urban communities in a few countries such as Brazil and South Africa. The most numerous, most vibrant and politically influential groups within Vía Campesina are the Latin American block, the (Western) European group and a few Asian movements. This influence is partly reflected by, or has resulted in, a global leadership power distribution that tends to reinforce the American-European influence. Half of the membership of the ICC, an 18-person body (as of 2007), comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. The organization’s African membership is growing, but still relatively small and highly heterogeneous in itself, ranging from the mainly peri-urban landless people in South Africa to small-scale farmers in Mozambique. The most consolidated organization in the region with an organizational and political orientation closest to its American-European and Asian counterparts is UNAC. There are two vibrant members in West Africa, namely CNCR in Senegal and CNOP in Mali (plus CPM in Madagascar). However, unlike nearly all other Vía Campesina members, CNCR (and CPM) simultaneously maintains its membership with the Vía Campesina rival, IFAP.

The movements from Latin American and some Asian countries are the most vocal groups within Vía Campesina in the GCAR. In Latin America, among the most recognized voices are those of the MST in Brazil and COCOCH in Honduras. In Asia, movements from the Philippines and Indonesia (especially when the global secretariat of Vía Campesina was moved to Indonesia in 2004; see Peluso et al. this collection), and recently some groups from South Asia, while

23 For this group, refer for example to the explanation made by Stedile (2002).
24 The past couple of decades have witnessed the resurgence of rural social movements in Latin America (see, e.g. Veltmeyer 1997), including indigenous people’s movements (Yashar 2005) in a scale and degree of political radicalization seen only in a few places in Asia and Africa during the same period. This largely accounts for the natural dominance of the Latin American contingent in the global leadership body of Vía Campesina.
25 União Nacional de Camponeses or National Peasants’ Union.
26 Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux.
27 Coordination National de Organisations Paysannes (CNOP).
28 Coalition Paysanne de Madagaskar.

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important in their own right are not (yet) as cohesive or powerful as the solid
Latin American block, perhaps for a combination of reasons, including signifi-
cant linguistic diversity and ideological differences. Nonetheless, together, the
Latin American and Asian landless peasant and rural workers’ movements (plus
perhaps the LPM before it contracted), were the main force behind the push for
Vía Campesina to carry out land reform as a strategic global campaign.

The combined force of these groups was so influential that it prevailed even
when another powerful group within Vía Campesina – i.e. KRRS – initially
objected to land reform being a major campaign. India’s KRRS, whose main
mass base is middle and rich farmers, was decisively overruled on this matter. It
is relevant to elaborate on KRRS. This group has been engaged since the 1980s
on anti-TNC and later on anti-GM crops campaigns. Many of these campaigns
have been dramatic in form and so got the media spotlight (Scoones this collec-
tion; Herring 2007). This campaign connects well with Northern advocacy against
GM crops. As such, KRRS has become a critical actor in Vía Campesina’s global
anti-GM crops and anti-TNC campaigns. It has become extremely influential
within the global movement and in turn earned the role of being the ‘gatekeeper’
in South Asia. But KRRS consciously evades issues that could bring sharper class
issues. M.D. Nanjundaswamy, the leader of KRRS (who died in early 2004)
explained earlier that: ‘we cannot divide ourselves into landlords and landless
farmers, and agitate separately, for the agitation will have no strength nor will it
carry any weight’ (Assadi 1994, 215). It is not surprising therefore that ‘the KRRS
opposes legislative ceilings on rural land while simultaneously advocating limits
to the ownership of urban industrial property’ (Assadi 1994, 213). Moreover,
writing more than ten years ago, Assadi explained that ‘both the [Maharashtra-
based Shetkari Sanghatana and the Karnataka-based KRRS] have not only not
condemned atrocities against tribals and the segregation of Dalits but in some
instances the perpetrators of such actions have themselves been their own members’

What the KRRS case reveals is that serious class-based differences exist within
and between movements that are (un-)affiliated with Vía Campesina. It would
be equally relevant to use a class analytic lens to examine the various Bharatiya
Kisan Union state organizations affiliated (or not) with Vía Campesina, and for
this it would be useful to consult the various studies in an earlier volume edited
by Brass (1994). These class-based differences have profound implications for the
way campaign demands are framed and representation is constructed within a
movement. In the case of KRRS, a significant proportion of the organized sec-
tion of the rural-based exploited social classes not only in India but in South Asia
more generally were excluded from the Vía Campesina process, either because
KRRS blocked their entry into Vía Campesina or they refused to participate in
the process where the ‘gatekeeper’ was KRRS.29 Some of these organizations
were able to gain entry into Vía Campesina much later. When Nanjundaswamy

29 Information about this is based on numerous conversations of the author with key movement
leaders within Vía Campesina and from various groups in India over the years.

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died in early 2004, 16 organizations from South Asia joined or were allowed entry into Vía Campesina a few months after. To date, a significant number of organizations of the landless rural poor in India have remained outside Vía Campesina, partly due to the continuing influence of KRRS and partly due to the political and ideological complications that emerged and developed in the late 1990s.30

Yet the above situation is not the first and is not unique in the history of Vía Campesina. The first serious fall-out in Vía Campesina was Nicaragua’s UNAG.31 UNAG was one of the key founders of Vía Campesina, a convenor of one of the original pillars of Vía Campesina, i.e. the Central American ASOCODE, and was host to the global solidarity conference in 1992 in Managua from which the most concrete idea of building Vía Campesina took shape. UNAG has also been a member of IFAP, reflecting a closer affinity to fellow middle to rich farmers’ network and to issues more concerned about government support services, production and trade issues, and credit facility via bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. This is in contrast, for example, to the concerns of another Nicaraguan founding organization, the farmworkers’ association, ATC32 with landless people’s issues and demands such as wages and land. When the conflict erupted between the then emerging leaders of Vía Campesina and the facilitating Dutch NGO (PFS) over the nature and orientation of Vía Campesina (this NGO was advocating, among others, that Vía Campesina members should instead just join IFAP), UNAG sided with the Dutch NGO, chose to leave Vía Campesina, and remained in IFAP. While the incident appears to have been the usual ‘turf-related’ intra-movement political conflict, a closer look reveals a deeper class-based fault-line.

In short, taking a closer look at Vía Campesina, we see class-based differences within and between national movements.33 Class-based differentiation of groups within Vía Campesina partly validates the official claim by movement leaders that their problems and oppressors are the same, but at the same time it demonstrates that this assertion is only partly correct: rich farmers could be the oppressors of farmworkers; land reform is an issue to be resisted by rich farmers, high price for food products is a good policy for food surplus-producing farmers, bad news for food-deficit rural households, credit facilities and trade issues may not be a critical issue for landless subsistence rural workers who do not have significant farm surplus to sell anyway, wages are not favoured issues by middle and rich farmers but a fundamental issue to rural workers, and so on. Indeed, they are all ‘people of the land’, yet they have competing class-based interests. Acknowledging

30 This problem is captured in the issue raised by a close Vía Campesina ally, who said that ‘In India, a higher caste of farmers joined Vía Campesina, and now the lower castes are kept out of Vía Campesina. How to fix this?’ (anonymous close ally interviewed in Rosset with Martinez 2005, 37).
31 Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos.
32 Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo.
33 Some movements, especially large ones, are also class-differentiated. Although there is no specific reference to CNCR, the work by Oya (2007) on class-differentiated rural accumulation processes among farmers in Senegal indirectly suggests that CNCR has a highly differentiated base, with the leadership influenced by the more affluent ones (also based on a personal discussion with Oya).
such differences, rather than ignoring or dismissing their significance, is an important step toward finding ways to ensure truly inclusive and effective representation in decision-making and demand-making.

**Ideological and Political Differences**

Another source of tension is political ideology, which tends to be less talked about by TAM activists. Vía Campesina is a broad coalition of groups with diverse ideological orientations, including (i) varying strands of radical neo-populists, (ii) various types of Marxists, (iii) radical groups with anarchist tradition, (iv) radical environmentalists and (v) feminist activists. Many groups and individuals fall somewhere in between these broad categories, while others have overlapping orientations, e.g. neo-populist-feminist, and so on. Still others do not have any clear ideological provenance at all, or do not have well-developed ideological positions. The degree of ideological differences varies from one case to another. This diversity in ideological orientation is found not only between movements – compare, for example, Bangladesh’s orthodox Marxist group BKF\(^{34}\) with the unorthodox radical group SOC\(^{35}\) of Andalucía, Spain. Diversity is found also within movements, especially the larger ones, such as MST of Brazil and CNCR of Senegal. However, the global leadership is currently dominated by a coalition of all these significant currents, with a radical neo-populist tendency being the dominant current. It is important to note, however, that the overwhelming majority of the national movements within Vía Campesina are part of the wave of social movements that have broken free from paternalistic political party sponsorship and control.

Further illustration from the Philippines is relevant. Here, three movements are connected to Vía Campesina, but in varying ways, raising the question of how this may influence the terms of externalization of land issues into the global campaign of Vía Campesina. All of these groups have a mass base, or at least formal claims of a mass base, among poor peasants. The first is KMP, a Maoist-inspired legal peasant organization whose ideological position on land reform follows a more orthodox Marxist position, campaigning for the nationalization of land, advocating for state farms, although allowing for a transitional individual ownership (see, e.g. Putzel 1992, 1995; Lara and Morales 1990). KMP’s call for ‘genuine agrarian reform’ means land confiscation without compensation to large landlords and free land distribution to peasants (KMP 1986). KMP rejects the state land reform law (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program or CARP) as ‘pro-landlord and anti-peasant’, a ‘fake land reform’. KMP was one of the founding organizations of Via Campesina and represented Asia in the ICC during the latter’s formative years. KMP’s campaign is to thrash CARP; it employs a mainly agit-prop method. The second is DKMP,\(^{36}\) a group that broke away

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34 Bangladesh Krishok Federation.  
35 Sindicato Obrero del Campo.  
36 Democratic KMP. 

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from KMP in 1993 due to ideological differences. The DKMP took a more radical neo-populist position in terms of land reform, advocating the cause of small family farms. However, largely because of personality differences among its leaders, DKMP failed to rally up and consolidate its forces. By the second half of the 1990s, DKMP had shrunk to a handful of peasant leaders and pockets of rice farmers in Central Luzon. With a few land reform cases and modest support from a few NGOs, DKMP has been able to maintain a relatively weak presence. Partly because it has weakened over time, DKMP continues to navigate within the parameters of the state land reform law, but uses less mass movement and more contacts within NGOs and government offices to facilitate favourable decisions for its few land claims (Borras 2007).

Both KMP and DKMP remain Vía Campesina members, although in recent years, and partly due to ideological reasons, KMP has fallen from grace within Vía Campesina (this will be discussed later). As a result, one finds an ironic situation where one member organization with a relatively significant mass base (KMP) has been marginalized within Vía Campesina, while another member organization without any significant mass base (DKMP) has been mainstreamed within the global movement. The third group is UNORKA. A very large chunk of the peasant movement that broke away from the Maoist-inspired movement in the early 1990s did not find it conducive to rally under the banner of DKMP. Instead, they eventually regrouped under a new umbrella organization, UNORKA. Formalized only in 2000, UNORKA quickly became the largest group directly engaged in land reform in the Philippines, and it remains so today with its roots in nearly 800 agrarian disputes across the country (Borras 2007). Its mass base is mainly among the landless peasants and rural workers, and like the MST in Brazil, UNORKA is using the state land reform law as an institutional context for their campaigns, navigating within the parameters of the law by stretching its limits as well as by employing militant but pragmatic mass mobilization strategy (Franco forthcoming; for Brazil see Meszaros 2000). UNORKA is eclectic in terms of ideological position on land: while taking a generally neo-populist stance, it also has a significant base among rural workers, so its advocacy is not oriented exclusively towards small family-farm creation (Borras and Franco 2005; De la Rosa 2005). UNORKA wants to join Vía Campesina, but KMP objects and because of an organizational rule that essentially allows existing members to reject any applicant from its own country, to date UNORKA’s formal entry into the network remains blocked. Recently, however, despite objections from KMP, Vía Campesina has begun inviting UNORKA to some gatherings as an observer. In the global campaign, FIAN works closely with UNORKA, while LRAN (through the Focus on the Global South) works with UNORKA and DKMP.

What the Philippine case shows is that even when there are no significant class-based differences between movements, ideological differences make for

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37 National Coordination of Autonomous Local Rural People’s Organizations.
important cleavages between them (recall Landsberger and Hewitt 1970). Ironically, there is less commonality between KMP (or DKMP) and MST regarding land reform strategy, and more commonality between MST and UNORKA; and yet KMP and DKMP are in, while UNORKA is out of Vía Campesina.

The Philippines is not the only case to highlight serious ideological cleavages within and between movements. Coming back to South Asia, we can see how the KRRS issue was used by other left-wing peasant groups in India to partly justify the formation of a separate, competing movement in the region, the Asian Peasant Coalition (APC). Its current secretariat is hosted by KMP. The strength of the APC network lies in its class line in terms of organizing poor peasants and rural workers; as a result, their main base is to be found among the most destitute strata of the peasantry, and thus this network has the potential to sharpen the class analysis and related demands of Vía Campesina, as well as to expand Vía Campesina’s representation in the region. The APC network could well have strengthened greatly the land reform campaign in Asia – if not, that is, for an ideological and political stance that tends to be extremely exclusivist and sectarian. From there, the relationship between APC and Vía Campesina has taken a downward spiral.38

Other differences are not exactly very ideological in nature, but more political. The tension between Vía Campesina members in Mexico is a good example, where UNORCA39 seems to have emerged to become the ‘gatekeeper’ in the country, relegating other important movements (e.g. ANEC40 and CNPA41) to the margins despite the latter’s objections. This fault-line is partly rooted in differences in political strategies, e.g. in relating with state programmes. A related example is the difference between Brazil’s MST and Senegal’s CNCR in terms of relating with the state and international development institutions: MST takes a far more autonomous stance from and conflictual relationship with these institutions, including taking an anti-World Bank position, while CNCR includes several government-sponsored organizations and opts to combine negotiation and intermittent confrontation with these institutions, including collaborative engagement with the World Bank (McKeon et al. 2004). It is a similar contrast we get looking at Vía Campesina-global and CNCR on these issues. Underpinning such differences, of course, are particularities embedded in the social and political histories of the different countries from which Vía Campesina members hail. The emerging tension in Southern Africa partly reflects such differences as well, though of a different kind. The point is that ideological and political differences are significant, and cannot be taken for granted.

38 Data and information on this are based on the author’s series of informal discussions with Vía Campesina leaders and other movement activists in Asia over the years.
39 Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autonomas.
40 Asociacion Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo.
41 Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala.
Political Representation

In a recent interview with the *Socialist Register*, MST’s Stedile talked about national movements and cross-national alliances. In part, he said: ‘We projected a shadow much bigger than what we really were, and we became famous for that. In fact, the MST as an organized force of the workers in Brazil is very small’ (2007, 195). Furthermore, he said that ‘African movements have a very low level of organization and are extremely poor, and many are still located at the tribal and local level. Few countries have a national movement’ (2007, 214).

Such candour about MST’s still limited representation of the landless in Brazil, as well as about the comparative strength of movements in the different regions, especially Africa, helps to situate Vía Campesina and the GCAR more realistically (see also the contribution by Wolford et al. in this collection). Despite Vía Campesina’s dramatic and impressive rise as a major international agrarian movement, the extent of its representation still remains fairly limited when seen from a global perspective. Even in the national bailiwicks of leading Vía Campesina members, its organized base remains limited, as Stedile’s comments about the MST in Brazil suggest. It is unlikely to be any better in other countries where Vía Campesina is present, notwithstanding the claims of its member organizations, which can sometimes be overblown. Meanwhile, the south of Asia is a vast sub-region, and to date the main stronghold of Vía Campesina is Southeast Asia (plus South Korea), which, although significant, does not constitute an organized majority there. For its part, South Asia is host to numerous militant movements of the rural working classes engaged in class-based struggles, but many of these movements are not formally integrated within Vía Campesina, while the leading Vía Campesina organization (KRRS) is a middle-rich farmers’ movement that evades discussion of social classes, class exploitation and class struggles, and stands against land reform. No significant national agrarian movements today in either Central Asia or the Middle East come close to Vía Campesina’s political orientation or have formal links to it. Meanwhile, very large countries with large rural working classes such as China and the former USSR are also out of the orbit of Vía Campesina, so that some types of peasant resistance are likely to be missed in Vía Campesina’s discourse (see, e.g. O’Brien and Li 2006; Kerkvliet 2005; see also Le Mons Walker as well as Malseed in this collection). Finally, in the vast African region, there are only a very few (five) members of Vía Campesina, and these movements’ representation of the rural working classes in their countries is even more limited than that of MST in Brazil. In short, though more significant than any other transnational agrarian movement, Vía Campesina directly represents only a small fraction of the global rural working classes (at least for now).

Bringing in the diversity of land issues not only in countries where Vía Campesina members are present, but also in the many countries where they are still absent (including the vast ex-socialist countries ‘in transition’ – see, e.g. Spoor forthcoming), will certainly complicate the current ‘global issue-framing’ and demand-making processes and dynamics. Meanwhile, the global land
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The reform debate itself has not remained static, but is also evolving, complicating Vía Campesina’s position even further, since one of the major policy battles around contemporary land policy issues is being, and will be, fought around the issue of ‘formalization’ of land rights in, and ‘privatization’ of, remaining public lands (see, e.g. De Soto 2000; Cousins 2007). It is not the classic land reform issue, but it affects perhaps even more segments of the rural population. Most of the affected settings for such a campaign are precisely the regions where Vía Campesina’s presence is very thin if not totally absent, such as Africa. The threat from formalization/privatization initiatives and its relations to the GCAR campaign-framing is captured in what the Mozambican leader Diamantino Nhampossa from UNAC said: ‘We already had a thorough agrarian reform. In order for [GCAR] to help us, it must focus on the challenge we are facing – “counter-agrarian reform” under neoliberalism. If the [GCAR] keeps focusing on just being “against latifundio” [private large estates], then it is less relevant to us.’ Nhampossa added, ‘The World Bank is promoting a new wave of land privatization [in Mozambique], and that needs to be denounced. We think the [GCAR] needs to broaden its mandate, it needs to also be a campaign “in defense of land” . . . against privatization of land.’

While GCAR has started to resort to ‘global issue-framing’ around this particular issue, in effect, there are no significant local/national campaigns to be ‘externalized’. This explains why the GCAR has made significant inroads in the conventional land reform issues, but to date has not (yet) gained any significant ground around the campaigns on anti-formalization and anti-privatization of public lands. But if ‘externalization’ is indeed key to building coherent and durable transnational networks (as Tarrow argues), then Vía Campesina ought to expand its presence into these areas first. In a sense, Vía Campesina now faces a dilemma: should it put its time and resources into expanding its presence beyond its current limits and into areas targeted by the neoliberal ‘formalization’ agenda, or should it continue to oppose this agenda without a significant local base to back it up? In the end, whether and how GCAR would be able to reposition itself and make a significant impact on current and future broader land policy issues will most likely depend on making the two political processes, i.e. combining global issue-framing from above and initiatives to launch local/national campaigns from below towards externalization, mutually reinforcing – a ‘sandwich strategy’. It is a challenge that may require Vía Campesina to rethink and recast some of its organizational rules, alliance-building, ideas about forms

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42 For example, up to 90 per cent of Indonesia’s agricultural lands are officially considered ‘state forest land’ (see, e.g. Peluso 1992).

43 Interview in Rosset with Martinez (2005, 21–22). Via Campesina has actually formally launched GCAR in Africa in January 2007 during the World Social Forum in Nairobi, essentially calling for land restitution and land redistribution, targeting the white commercial farms in Africa. But in countries where such an issue is still relatively ‘hot’ (e.g. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia), Vía Campesina is nearly absent. An insider within Vía Campesina interviewed by the author admitted that the Nairobi declaration is more of an ‘agit-prop’ political statement than a launch of a real campaign. For excellent background discussions about contemporary land issues in Africa, see Peters (2004) and Berry (2002).
of resistance and collective actions, and perspectives on land, among others. For instance, it may not be politically prudent and creative to insist on purely ‘national peasant movements’ as an organizational requirement in linking up with groups in many settings where such movements are unlikely to emerge anytime soon. Some transitional measures are likely to be helpful, such as forging alliances and understanding with groups including local progressive NGOs. Waiting for national peasant movements – in the image and likeness of Vía Campesina’s ‘ideal’ national members – to emerge in these settings is likely to take a very long time, if it will ever come at all. What Nico Verhagen, Vía Campesina’s senior staff, said in the context of Africa, if implemented, can perhaps open up some initial paths: ‘Right now many organizations in Africa do not have very clear political positions, but that can change. For example, in the case of ROPPA, the more they interact with the Vía Campesina the more they are radicalizing . . . Our strategy in Africa should be to open up spaces for dialogue with Vía Campesina, and invite everyone in.’

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The GCAR launched and led by Vía Campesina and coordinated with its allies has gained significant ground transnationally in terms of putting the issue of land reform and its opposition to MLAR onto the official agendas of development agencies and civil society. It has reshaped the terms of the current policy and political debates. It has been able to construct an alternative land policy vision. However, it has not gained any significant ground in terms of actual favourable policy reforms, internationally and in national settings, nor has it resulted in significant procedural changes or caused favourable behavioural changes among key actors in development institutions. Part of the reason why GCAR has been mounted and sustained was primarily due to successful processes of ‘externalization’ of local/national issues and campaigns. More specifically, the campaign which was mainly an anti-MLAR campaign, got mainstreamed quickly within Vía Campesina because MLAR was carried out in countries where influential members of Vía Campesina are situated and affected by MLAR.

But the GCAR has also revealed latent cleavages and fault-lines within Vía Campesina that are class-based and ideological. Confronting, not backing away from, such issues may contribute towards further ideological, political and organizational consolidation within Vía Campesina. What Paul Nicholson, a farmer from the Basque (Spain) and a key Vía Campesina leader, explained in 2004 about the movement’s principles in alliance-building provides a fundamental starting point: ‘The alliance between farmers, men and women peasants, with

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44 In this context, the literature of everyday forms of peasant resistance can offer some relevant insights, see, e.g. Scott (1985), Kerkvliet (2005) and O’Brien and Li (2006). Refer also to Chavez and Franco (2007) for a relevant discussion about civil society in Africa.
45 Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.
46 Interview in Rosset with Martinez (2005, 30).
47 This was during a press briefing in Sao Paolo on 11 June 2004 on the occasion of the IV global assembly of Vía Campesina held in Brazil. http://www.viacampesina.org; Accessed 30 October 2007.
rural workers, is a fundamental alliance in the rural world.’ Taking seriously what Nicholson said is to recognize class issues, among others, within the movement.

Moreover, the GCAR has also exposed important weaknesses of Vía Campesina in terms of its current spread worldwide, and so its actual capacity to represent diverse interests of various groups in different settings. An understanding of these issues will help clarify why there has been no similar significant impact made by Vía Campesina in opposition to the land rights formalization and land privatization policies targeted towards public lands which are being carried out to a large extent in national–local settings where Vía Campesina’s presence is thin if not totally absent. For Vía Campesina to be able to reposition its leadership in land issues worldwide, i.e. to deepen and widen the scope of its campaign, the option is not an either/or choice between ‘global issue framing from above and then diffuse this nationally/locally’ or ‘local/national campaigns from below then externalize this onto international level’. Rather, perhaps the most promising option would be to adopt a ‘sandwich strategy’ to simultaneously push for these two processes from above and from below.

ACRONYMS USED

ANEC (Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo)
ASOCODE (Association of Central American Peasant Organizations for Cooperation and Development)
ATC (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo)
BKF (Bangladesh Krishok Federation)
CNCR (Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux)
CNOP (Coordination National de Organisations Paysannes)
CNPA (Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala)
COCOCH (Honduran Coordinating Council of Peasant Organizations)
CONTAG (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura)
CPM (Coalition Paysanne de Madagaskar)
DKMP (Demokratikong Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas)
EU (European Union)
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations)
FETRAF (Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar)
FIAN (Foodfirst Information and Action Network)
GCAR (global campaign for agrarian reform)
ICARRD (International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development)
ICC (International Coordinating Committee – of Vía Campesina)
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development)
IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural Producers)
IPC (International Planning Committee)
KMP (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas)
KRRS (Karnataka State Farmers’ Association)
LPM (Landless People’s Movement)
LRAN (Land Research and Action Network)
MLAR (market-led agrarian reform)
MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra)
NLC (National Land Committee)
PCT (Projeto Cedula da Terra)
ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest)
SOC (Sindicato Obrero del Campo)
TAM (transnational agrarian movement)
UNAC (União Nacional de Camponeses or National Peasants’ Union)
UNAG (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos)
UNORCA (Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas)
UNORKA (National Coordination of Autonomous Local Rural People’s Organizations)

REFERENCES


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